Through a cost-minimizing approach, this paper derives four joint indicators to assess the ef…ciency of the mix of sovereign debt currencies between the countries belonging to the European Monetary Union (EMU). This theoretical insight enables us to explain why and how the introduction of the euro and the adoption of a common monetary policy may have led to signi…cant changes in debt structure among EMU members, notably in favor of further euro-denominated debt. The interplay of intrinsic and strategic variables yields stylized facts that are consistent with country-speci…c empirical evidence. Following the sovereign debt crisis, we further emphasize the value-added of a coordinated debt issuance policy among EMU countries.
I. Introduction
The 2010-11 European sovereign debt crisis, triggered by concerns over the credit risk of the Greek government debt, has shown that euro-denominated bond spreads are largely driven by direct default risk.
The common currency acts as a cushion against the temptation to perform competitive devaluations to avoid mere default by distressed governments. This case emphasizes that the adoption of a common monetary policy has substantially altered the market perception of the key drivers of sovereign debt value. This major breakthrough nevertheless has raised many questions about the evolution of yield spreads for …xed income securities issued by the Eurosystem member countries. Investors and other market participants scrutinize for (un)sustainable debt levels and country's debt vulnerability in valuing sovereign debt. Fiscal de…cits and projections for the debt-to-GDP ratio are standard indicators for investors to assess the riskiness of a country's sovereign debt. However, these indicators alone do not re ‡ect the whole situation of a country's debt. It is also relevant for investors to review the (in)appropriateness of the country's currency debt structure (proportion of domestic currency denominated debt vs. foreign currency denominated debt) and its maturity pro…le. From that perspective, no indicator can be looked at in isolation. Moreover, if the euro triggered a noticeable change in the relative cost of domestic and foreign debt of European Monetary Union (EMU) member states, one should also observe a corresponding shift in the debt management indicators. These questions are addressed in this paper.
We adopt a cost-minimizing approach to the problem of de…ning the appropriate mix of debt currencies with their associated maturities by sovereign governments, which should be their formal goal to reassure investors about their debt management process. Our approach entails the existence of a complete market, which implies that the government's political commitment is …rmly set and known by market participants at the very moment of the review of debt composition. Consequently, we take as given the level and expected evolution of taxes and government expenditures, which have been …rmly set and communicated to the market.
Nevertheless, the impact of these sovereign decisions on the current and future costs of debt is accounted for.
Under the framework developed by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999), the yearly cost of sovereign debt is represented by its continuous yield spread. The objective function to minimize should thus be the sum of the total cost incurred over the lifetime of debt denominated in domestic and in foreign currency. Such an approach allows us to stick to the …nancial modeling of yield spreads and to focus on the identi…cation of their determinants. To be convincing, the decision of issuing domestic or foreign debt with their respective maturities by a government obviously implies a trade-o¤ between the costs associated with each type of issue.
Such costs are likely to be di¤erent for countries from outside or inside the EMU, but also among members, depending on whether debt policies are coordinated or not. To assess the appropriateness of both debt structure and maturity pro…le, we derive four composite indicators throughout our theoretical framework: the intrinsic and strategic default, devaluation (including in ‡ation), liquidity, and the exchange rate risk.
These four debt e¢ ciency indicators must be taken into account altogether since the outcome will be the result of an interplay between them. The optimal solution that we obtain is an explicit function of these four sources of risk. It enables us to consider the sources and direction of changes in yield spreads consecutive to the EMU advent, and to deliver theoretical results regarding the predicted change in debt currency composition after the adoption of the euro.
Our modeling approach also allows us to identify a potential improvement in the way governments could …nance at the lowest possible cost. A central, coordinated approach to determine debt levels and maturities would result in a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. The idea of Euro bonds raised in September 2011 was a step in that direction, but it was motivated by urgency. Long-term economic gains shared across the EMU countries could be achieved by designing a more structural mechanism. The theoretical directions of our framework are matched with data collected on ten EMU member countries during the immediate pre-and post-EMU period. Through evidence gathered from the evolution of debt-related variables, our empirical results indicate that the predicted directions of policy changes are overall consistent with the observed evolution in sovereign debt data.
The next section reviews the evolution of the sovereign debt structure issued by EMU members before and after the advent of the euro in 1999. Section III proposes a theoretical model deriving the optimal currency structure for countries that do not belong to a monetary union. Section IV analyses the impact of the EMU on the model. Section V matches the theoretical predictions with stylized facts. Section VI concludes.
II. Evolution of the debt characteristics of EMU members
Overall, the literature reaches a broad consensus on the regime switch within the dynamics of sovereign bond spreads triggered by the achievement of the EMU. Following the removal of exchange rate risks, Wolswijk and de Haan (2006) …nd that the strategies of government debt managers in the EMU countries have evolved towards a convergence of practices since the introduction of the euro. Two key features among these countries are the decline in the share of the debt denominated in non-euro currencies and the tendency to issue plain vanilla bonds. In this respect, Gilson and Gérard (2002) state that a decrease in foreign currency denominated debt will be observed when a central bank starts to be perceived as a credible institution able to commit to low in ‡ation.
Yield spread decomposition is essential for deriving policy implications (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009 ).
Credit risk stands as an important determinant of the spread of government debt denominated in foreign currencies. It is associated with market discipline and the sustainability of public …nances. Codogno et al. (2003) , Geyer et al. (2004) , Jankowitsch et al. (2006) , Beber et al. (2009) and Favero et al. (2010) document that the default risk premium is lower for the …rst years of the EMU. More recently, however, sovereign credit spreads surged following the 2007 …nancial crisis and a risk transfer from the …nancial to the public sector (Attinasi et al. 2009, Eijsing and Lemke 2011) . However, Governments with relatively favorable …scal positions may bene…t from lower relative borrowing costs in times of crises, while increasing …scal de…cits are likely to increase spreads across all countries (Haugh et al. 2009 , Attinasi et al. 2009 ). Arnold and Lemmen (2001) also argue that the EMU has increased credit risk by denying governments the emergency exit of money creation.
Liquidity risk is another component of yield spreads, translating imperfect bond market integration. Jankowitsch et al. (2006) , Gomez-Puig (2006) , Beber et al. (2009) , Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009), and Favero et al. (2010) generally …nd that liquidity e¤ects play a non-trivial role but cannot alone explain the size of the cross-EMU government bond yield spreads. Such a point of view is consistent with Bernoth et al. (2004) , who …nd that the liquidity premium is reduced with EMU membership.
Tables 1 reports key average rates and debt data for 10 EMU countries 1 during the time window surrounding the freezing date of parities of local currencies against the euro (January 1, 1999). The window is split between the pre-EMU (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and the post-EMU (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) periods. The country of reference for the spread computations is Germany, which has the strongest currency and the lowest in ‡ation among the EMU members. (Daily) swap rate and 10-year benchmark government bond yield data come from Thomson Financial Datastream. Public debt data come from the Central Government Debt statistical yearbook, published annually by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Data reported in this publication usually originate from central banks and public debt agencies.
In Table 1 , as in Favero et al. (1997) , Blanco (2001) , Codogno et al. (2003) , and Gomez-Puig (2006 , 2008 , 2009 ), we correct the pre-EMU yield spreads for the foreign exchange and in ‡ation component, approximated by the swap di¤erential. The adjusted spread is therefore equal to the di¤erence between the yield spread and the swap spread. Liquidity spreads are computed as the di¤erence in spreads between the yields of the on-the-run and o¤-the-run 10-year benchmark bonds, which are generally the two most recent issues for this maturity (Warga 1992 , Strebulaev 2002 , Fleming 2002 , Babbel et al. 2004 , Jankowitsch et al. 2006 ). On-therun benchmark bonds are more actively traded and intensively monitored than the o¤-the-run benchmark.
They are therefore very liquid (Fleming 2002 , Jankowitsch et al. 2006 ) and we consider their liquidity premium as negligible, considering the adjusted spread as being essentially associated with default risk.
Swap rates already experienced a strong convergence the year before the introduction of the euro (1998), compared to the preceding years. The swap spread was already relatively smaller for Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. They had constituted a core of currencies that were strongly and e¤ectively pegged to the Deutsche Mark inside the European Monetary System (EMS). The largest spreads are found for the higherin ‡ation volatile currencies of the Southern states (Italy, Portugal, Spain). But even for those countries, a sharp reduction of the spread is observed, as the introduction of the euro approaches. As for the adjusted spread, we observe that the exchange rate/in ‡ation factor proxied by the swap spread heavily a¤ected the yield spread for many countries, especially for Southern countries, which is consistent with Blanco (2001) and Favero et al. (2010) .
Post-EMU liquidity spreads are lower than default spreads, as already evidenced by many authors (Codogno et al. 2003 , Geyer et al. 2004 , and Jankowitsch et al. 2006 , except in Ireland. The largest countries appear to be the most liquid markets (Germany, France and Italy), as expected according to the traditional positive link between size and liquidity (Warga 1992, Crabbe and Turner 1995) . By contrast, Finland and Ireland exhibit larger liquidity spreads before the EMU, which can justify higher shares of foreign currency debt. Liquidity has particularly improved for Finnish bonds since the launch of the EMU. Slight increases in liquidity spreads can be observed for Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands and Spain after 1999. Limited bond supply due to improving public …nances could explain this pattern. These results are consistent with the evidence shown by Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) and Beber et al. (2009) who support the existence of a positive liquidity risk premium after the EMU.
According to the Maastricht Treaty criteria, countries that were more heavily indebted before the EMU, such as Belgium and Italy, have continuously decreased the total debt-to-GDP ratio in order to approach the target of 60%. Regarding the currency composition of national debt, a clear decline in the proportion of the debt denominated in foreign (non-euro) currencies can be observed, with the exception of Spain. Prior to adopting the euro, most of the members'foreign debt is denominated in currencies of other (future) EMU members. It not therefore surprising to observe a speci…c decline in foreign debt in 1999, but the decline continues during the subsequent years thereafter in any case. Unquestionably, the euro has also allowed the EMU members to increase the proportion of government securities held by non-residents, which indicates that the markets for debt issued by the EMU member countries have reinforced their integration. This phenomenon is in line with a phenomenon of reinforcing the role of default risk and reducing the impact of in ‡ation and devaluation risk in the spread processes, with a limited role of liquidity risk.
In the next sections, we develop a framework that aims at capturing the shift in sovereign debt currency, while controlling for debt maturity, consecutive to the adoption of euro as a common currency in EMU.
III. Indicators without the EMU
We …rst derive the e¢ ciency indicators before the advent of the EMU. When market participants scrutinize sovereign debt in the absence of the EMU, they must take into account the possibility a¤orded to the government to levy on in ‡ation or on devaluation. These actions serve as tools to decrease the real value of domestic debt and thus to capture an indirect tax (see Bohn, 1988; Bohn, 1990; Miller, 1997) . Investors monitor these risks and demand a compensation for bearing them. For the government, the existence of the Eurozone yields e¤ects similar to the interdiction of issuing money, which applies to any province, state or other public issuer. The main di¤erence with the countries adhering to the EMU is that, in their case, they transit from the absence to the presence of EMU, and so we can observe and dissect the impact for investors of their loss of sovereignty.
A. Model setup
Two economies, the domestic and the foreign one, use a di¤erent currency, u D and u F respectively. The domestic government can issue debt in domestic or in foreign currency units on the debt market. This government has a target debt maturity T and wishes to pay back a given amount in real terms, normalized to 1 unit of the foreign currency, by issuing zero-coupon bonds. When de…ning its debt structure, it chooses the face value D of debt issued in the domestic currency, given that the face value of the foreign debt is the residual amount F = 1 D. The government can also set the debt maturities, T D for domestic debt and T F for foreign debt, provided that the average maturity, weighted by face value, is equal to T :
Face value and average debt maturity are exogenously de…ned by the government. Debt mix should be chosen so as to minimize the aggregate interest cost of debt.
The government is already locked into the current …scal and monetary policies, as well as the level of government expenditures. The impact of these policies is summarized by the stochastic process of the total debt to the GDP, named (t), represented by the following Arithmetic Brownian Motion:
where Z (t) is the time-t value of a one-dimensional Brownian Motion 2 . Standard useful indicators for investors are coe¢ cients 0 and 1 representing the political commitment to the government's public de…cit, and standing for the volatility of public de…cits due to random shocks to the economic and political conditions. In particular, the linear time trend can be interpreted by market participants as a political commitment to increase or decrease de…cits along a given political line. A value of 1 = 0 stands for a commitment to a steady evolution of the debt ratio 3 . As we focus on the di¤erential impact of the proportion of domestic and foreign debt in the spread components, the debt process is further decomposed in a domestic and a foreign part ln (t) = ln F (t) + ln D (t) where:
The de…nition of the cost of debt should be independent of the country's monetary policy. Thus, it is computed in foreign currency units. Assuming that the existence of a nominal money market account is guaranteed for each economy, the exchange rate process X(t) between u D and u F follows a Geometric Brownian Motion represented by:
where x 0 represents the structural drift of the exchange rate process, x t re ‡ects the market impact of the government's debt management, and Z x (t) is a SBM and corr(Z x (t); Z (t)) = x . Meese and Rogo¤ (1983) show that a simple random walk model of the exchange rate performs as well as any other one. The introduction of D in the drift term is the natural consequence of the e¤ect of the proportion of domestic debt on the in ‡ation level and process as well as on the government's incentive to devaluate. A negative value of x 0 or x t means respectively that u F is weaker than u D ; or that the management of public de…cits is less e¤ective in the foreign country.
A government seldom makes an outright default. Rather, it may repeatedly force debt restructuring or renegotiation (Bulow and Rogo¤, 1989) . For this reason, government debt can be priced using similar reduced-form models of default credit (and other) events, as suggested by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999) . These authors show that we can allow for default risk (and other possible risks) by replacing the discount rate r(t) with a default-adjusted discount rate r(t) + s(t). When default (or another event) occurs, bondholders recover a fraction proportional to the pre-default market value, which is still subject to default risk. In this study, we are interested in minimizing the spreads s(t) associated with the various risks of the bond. The cost of debt is then de…ned as the average yield spread to maturity of each type of debt, expressed in foreign currency units, weighted by the corresponding promised amount and maturity. In order to stick to the e¤ect of debt composition on this weighted average cost, we assume an independent interest rate process. The cost function is thus:
where Y j (T j ); j = D; F is the annual yield spread to maturity of a zero-coupon bond issued by the domestic government, expressed in currency u F , respectively on the domestic and the foreign debt market. This cost function can be rewritten as:
where s j (t); j = D; F is the spot spread of a zero-coupon issued by the domestic government respectively on the domestic and the foreign debt market. Through this cost function, the government attempts to minimize the weighted average cost of debt to convince the market of the e¤ectiveness of its debt management.
To derive our indicators, our main challenge is to characterize the term structure of spreads associated with domestic and foreign debt. In addition to default risk, sovereign spreads should capture the risks of surprise in ‡ation and currency devaluation as these factors threaten bond value. The existing literature suggests that the main determinant of the spread of foreign debt would be default risk, whereas devaluation and in ‡ation risks would primarily a¤ect domestic debt . Kremer and Mehta (2000) study a model in which governments are more inclined to default if a large proportion of their debt is held by foreigners, because each government cares about the welfare of its citizens. The authors extend their model to include a government that could credibly commit to repaying but that prefers to issue domestic-currency-denominated debt rather than foreign-currency-denominated debt. Claessens et al. (2004) show that higher in ‡ation is associated with a higher share of domestic currency debt.
Devaluation and default are voluntary actions taken by the government. These decisions can be triggered by shocks similar to the ones a¤ecting the ratio of debt over GDP, but they can also be motivated by the government's debt management strategy. Ex ante, on e¢ cient debt markets, this propensity to devaluate or to default on debt would be recognized by the market participants and the government in question would be penalized by the proceeds of debt issues through a higher risk premium.
Default risk, although in principle avoided on the domestic market through the ability to print money, could a¤ect domestic debt because the social bene…t of the relief of debt pressure may exceed the additional political cost of defaulting on domestic together with foreign debt (Nielsen, 1999) . Similarly, …nancial markets might fear that a devaluation could lead the country to weaken its potential ability to pay o¤ foreign debt in case of trouble, because of the increase in the political and social costs of a further devaluation.
Finally, a potential explanation for sovereign spreads relates to liquidity issues (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Warga, 1992; Kamara, 1994; Krishnamurthy, 2002) . Investors may require a liquidity premium for holding "illiquid" assets in order to reward them for bearing higher transaction costs, including taxes. The relative lack of liquidity of debt denominated in the (less liquid) domestic currency unit can lead a government to issue greater debt in foreign currency units. Similarly, the liquidity premium on foreign debt can be conditional on the liquidity level of the domestic debt, given the smaller number of market participants.
We therefore consider that the foreign spread is made up of three components: one related to direct credit risk, and two relating to the indirect e¤ects of devaluation and liquidity risk. Similarly, the domestic spread involves four components: two due to direct devaluation and liquidity risks (the former incorporating in ‡ation risk), and one due to indirect default risk. Since all these risks are manifested through risk premiums, they are considered to be additive. They exhibit the following structure:
where j = D; F: The …rst term j represents the default spread; j is the devaluation spread, where the domestic spread includes in ‡ation risk; and j stands for the liquidity spread.
B. Debt valuation
Parsimony is necessary to derive interpretable optimality results and to analyze the subsequent comparative statics. We assume all spreads in equation (6) to be normally distributed with no mean-reversion. 4 Consider …rst default risk. Unlike companies, governments cannot simply go bankrupt, because their country cannot be merely liquidated. Rather, the state of default is likely to be associated to the incapacity of meeting coupon payments, or to the willingness to scale down the face value of outstanding debt. These situations involve both a proportion of debt remaining alive after default and, more importantly, that remaining debt still being submitted to the future default risk of the very same country (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) .
The reduced-form model of default proposed by Du¢ e and Singleton (1999), who represent the spread as the product s(t) = h(t)l(t) where h(t) is the arrival rate of default and l(t) is the loss rate upon default, is particularly suited to this situation. 5 For the case of foreign debt, intrinsic default risk is the primary component of the cost of debt. It is mostly the outcome of a political decision by the government and the level of risk aversion. In addition, the average remaining maturity of this type of debt, (T F t); weighted by the proportion of foreign debt, F , in ‡uences the decision to default. A high weighted average time to maturity negatively a¤ects the incentive to default on foreign debt (consistent with Missale and Blanchard, 1994) , because of the negative relationship between maturity and the present value of a zero-coupon debt.
We thus …nd the product F (T F t) in the spread de…nition. Finally, some decisions to default depend on the total stock of debt to GDP, sensitive to the composition of new debt and to unexpected shocks in economic conditions, which is represented by process ln F (t). This is in line with Faini (2006) who …nds that …scal policy and debt levels signi…cantly a¤ect both sovereign bond spreads and the overall level of interest rates in the EMU. Thus, we characterize the foreign default spread as:
To get the indirect e¤ect of default risk on the domestic spread, the arrival risk of default is lowered by a fraction corresponding to the additional social cost of defaulting on domestic debt. The trade-o¤ between D and T D is essentially similar as for foreign debt. This yields the following:
where represents the propensity to default on domestic debt conditional on defaulting on foreign debt. It is negatively related to the social and political costs of domestic default (see Alesina et al., 1992) .
The analysis of devaluation spreads is very similar. Devaluation involves a sudden drop in the market value of debt, with its associated arrival and magnitude risks. The domestic spread is directly a¤ected by this risk, while the foreign spread only bears this risk indirectly. The reasons for devaluing are essentially of the same kind as for defaulting: political, strategic (and therefore related to the level of domestic debt and to its maturity) and stochastic. In addition, the domestic devaluation spread integrates the government's incentive to control in ‡ation, since it bene…ts from an "in ‡ation tax" on its outstanding domestic debt Pagano, 1990, Claessens et al. 2004) . The spreads exhibit a structure similar to the default risk ones:
where is the indirect market impact of a devaluation of the domestic currency on the foreign debt; it is an indicator of market con…dence. Note that if the Fisher e¤ect holds perfectly, we have that 0 + 0 = x 0 and t D = x t , as the impact of devaluation risk o¤sets the expected currency depreciation: only unexpected currency and devaluation risks remain. We do not net devaluation with currency risks however, because these two processes do not necessarily o¤set each other in the post-EMU situation.
As for liquidity spreads, we can use a similar approach, with the direct impact set on the domestic spread:
where is the indirect market impact of the (il)liquidity on the foreign debt.
This complete characterization of the spread processes enables us to assess the cost of …nancing through the following Proposition (all proofs are available upon request):
Proposition 1 The cost of …nancing one face value unit of government debt through a proportion D of domestic debt with maturity T D and the rest of foreign debt, with an average maturity of T; is given by:
Proposition 1 represents the basis for the analysis of sovereign debt management by market participants.
The cost function appears to be quadratic in the strategic arguments. The subsequent analysis is developed for a government whose only strategic variable is the proportion of domestic debt, leaving maturity constant.
C. Optimal debt mix
If the government sets identical maturities for domestic and foreign debt, the optimization problem has one strategic variable D: Denoting T single maturity of all debt; the solution to this problem has the form:
Proposition 2 If the maturities of foreign and domestic debt are equal to a constant T; the optimal proportion of domestic debt, denoted D opt , is given by:
where Y = K 11 and X = K 21 + K 22 T:
The …rst case, leading to an optimal decision to borrow entirely on the foreign market, involves the fact that Y 0 and that X is positive or negative provided jXj Y . The qualitative analysis depends on the maturity: if T is high, K 22 will be dominant in X, whereas K 21 is the driver for low values of T: The decisions to borrow fully on the domestic or on the foreign market must be scrutinized with di¤erent elements depending on whether short term or long term debt is issued. Corollary 3 If the maturities of foreign and domestic debt are equal; the following inequalities obtain: 8 > < > :
where D ij = @D @Kij ; i; j = 1; 2; Y = K 11 and X = K 21 + K 22 T .
Corollary 4
If the optimal proportion of domestic debt, denoted D opt is …xed, the optimal maturity of domestic debt is equal to
The pivot value of D ; i.e. the one for which the impact of X and of Y is balanced, is found to be
Again, there is not much di¤erence in the treatment of long term or short term debt, since the same kinds of tendency are to be observed. The sensitivity of the optimal proportion of domestic debt is indeed related to the ratio Y X . When D is in the neighborhood of 0, this ratio is very low, indicating that the optimal debt ratio is much more sensitive to D 11 (resp. D 12 ) than D 21 (resp. D 22 ) for short term (resp. long term) debt.
Intrinsic characteristics also dominate for low levels of domestic debt.
IV. Indicators in the Presence of the EMU
Countries adhering to the EMU do not resign their sovereignty over the choice of the optimal debt mix.
Rather, their decisions must re ‡ect the changes in devaluation, in ‡ation and default risks. Debt management indicators should be adjusted.
A. Modi…ed model
The advent of EMU implies that all countries share an identical monetary policy, decided by the European Central Bank (ECB). A single exchange rate, which is in ‡uenced by the aggregate in ‡ation process within the EMU, prevails for every country. It is assumed that the ECB would never decide to devalue the euro, as this kind of decision implies a political consensus of all member countries, who can in principle not put any pressure on the central bank. Yet, individual countries can indirectly impact on in ‡ation and exchange rates by setting debt levels and maturities, and by defaulting. The primary task of the ECB is to maintain price stability. What are concretely the changes involved for investors? First, the sovereign debt level process has to be reconsidered. Because of the convergence criteria, countries have to ensure a tighter control of their budget de…cit. However, although the necessary debt level relative to GDP and yearly budget de…cit were initially set as conditions for entering the EMU, experience shows that this was mainly meant to force a political commitment for "problem" countries like Belgium or Greece. The debt ratio process for any member country i takes this into account, and is split according to each country's domestic and foreign debt components as in equation (2):
where the main change is the intervention of a factor i impacting on the drift and di¤usion terms, representing the government's political commitment to control the evolution of debt: if i0 > 0 (too high debt level) or if it > 1 (budget de…cit out of control), i < 1 and the country is forced to put all its e¤orts towards the limitation of de…cits, including the ones resulting from unanticipated shocks.
Second, the exchange rate process of the euro with respect to the reference currency applies to all member countries. It has the form:
where w i is the weight of each country's total debt in the total debt issue, and D i is the proportion of this debt denominated in euros. The introduction of this weighted sum makes the exchange rate di¤er essentially from (3), because each country has an indirect impact through the proportion chosen, although the total debt e¤ect is mainly out of control. For formerly strong currencies like the German mark, x 0 0 > x i0 and/or x 0 t > x it ; while the reverse holds for weaker currencies. Parameter x stands for the adverse e¤ects of the lack of credibility of the "no bail out"clause: if market participants believe that the member countries could bail out one of them in case of di¢ culty, this weakens the euro.
Devaluation risk collapses to in ‡ation risk in the EMU setup, and this risk is common to all countries.
Even though each country still experiences its own in ‡ation risk spread, in ‡ation surprise and di¤erentials across countries narrow to persistently low levels. Since the ECB strongly commits to deliver an annual in ‡ation rate close to 2% at the EMU level, there is a sharp convergence in the medium-term in ‡ation rates.
The impact of each individual issue is reduced to the weight of each country in the total debt issue in the EMU. The contribution of each country to the aggregate in ‡ation process is accordingly reduced and so the in ‡ation spread. This follows a new spread process:
where z i is another weighting factor, applied to the contribution of each country's in ‡ation process to the overall in ‡ation in EMU. The structural in ‡ation ( As before, foreign as well as domestic debt are subject to recurrent default risk. The foreign debt spread is represented by a process very similar to equation (7):
and here, + i0 is a cost-reducing term arising from the government's ability to call upon the solidarity of other EMU members in case of virtual default. The other parameters are also likely to be higher than in (7), as there are fewer instruments available for a government to provide a substitute to default through in ‡ation or devaluation. Under the same approach as in the previous section, the domestic default spread writes:
Finally, both domestic and foreign debt spreads would still re ‡ect compensation for liquidity risk. The emergence of a larger market size and a broader range of market participants can surely have a bene…cial e¤ect on debt liquidity, notably through increasing cross-ownership. However, the fact that government bonds are still issued by separate government debt agencies with di¤erent needs, strategies, procedures and instruments may re ‡ect a signi…cant residual fragmentation. Gomez-Puig (2006) highlights the fact that the bene…ts of the EMU can be partly mitigated by the possible increased competition between euro-area government securities markets. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) support the existence of a positive liquidity risk premium after the EMU. In addition, the focus on the 10-year bond segment in combination with a limited bond supply, as a result of improving public …nances, can partially explain the presence of a liquidity premium. The liquidity spread process presents the following familiar form:
B. Optimal mix for a member country with no coordination of debt policies
Consider …rst that each government takes as given the level of domestic and foreign debt of all other member countries. It is easy to solve the optimization problem every country should face:
Proposition 5 The cost of …nancing one face value unit of government debt of member country i through a proportion D i of domestic debt with maturity T iD and the rest of foreign debt, with an average maturity of T i ; is given by:
(1
Corollary 6 If the maturities of foreign and domestic debt are equal to a constant T i ; the optimal proportion of domestic debt for country i, denoted D opt i , is given by:
where it > 0; then K i21 > 0 and K i22 decreases. Furthermore, the weight of the country in total debt also provides the relative importance of these factors for the determination of each country's mix. For heavy borrowers, K i22 is more likely to be higher and the optimal borrowing decision depends on the relative levels of K i11 and K i21 : The results of Corollary 3 apply, inducing countries whose weight is large in the EMU, to borrow more on the foreign market than would smaller issuers.
Second, credibility of the no bail out clause has asymmetric impacts. The cost-reducing e¤ect of a decrease in default risk if other countries bail out the one that defaults is included in K i00 and in K i11 ; but in the latter case this is moderated by a factor (1 0 i ). The global resulting increases in the in ‡ation and exchange rates both appear in K i11 , which is the only parameter intervening in the determination of the optimal debt proportion, and is essentially a short term factor. Therefore, the lower the credibility of the no bail out clause, the higher the incentive to borrow on the foreign market for countries whose social cost of defaulting on domestic debt is high. Intuitively, if i is close to 0, this means that defaulting in the foreign market is not likely to coincide with a default on domestic debt.
Third, parameters that seem unchanged are actually crucial for the assessment of the credit quality of member countries. Speci…cally, K i11 and K i22 are both very sensitive to credit quality. For T large enough,
In this case, EMU membership could lead to either an increase or a decrease in the optimal debt proportion. However, the impact of the di¤erence between 0 i and i is more pronounced for K i22 ; driving up the optimal ratio. Hence, the greater the di¤erence in social cost of domestic default incurred by entering the EMU, the more pronounced the incentive to issue domestic debt. By contrast, when T is low and if the no bail out clause is not credible (for a high value of + i0 ), the e¤ect of monetary union goes univocally towards an increase in the proportion of domestic debt. If the no bail out clause is credible, for low enough maturities, an increase in default risk could lead to a more pronounced foreign indebtedness.
C. Optimal coordination policy
So far, all parameters that were beyond the control of the government have been considered as given, including the w i D i ; which resulted from the same optimization process from other countries. However, if they were all to try to do this at the same time, they would need to know each other's choice of weights and debt proportions, which can only be done with some coordination. It is su¢ cient just to optimize the joint problem, of course, but the practical implementation of this exercise would require either strong political integration or considerable market pressure. We introduce a Pareto e¢ cient coordination procedure by a central borrowing agency. For the EMU as a whole, the total cost of debt is the weighted sum of the individual costs. By minimizing this sum, a central agency could …x the optimal domestic debt level, and reallocate this issue to individual countries using the same optimization process at the country level, hereby decreasing the vulnerability of the aggregate sovereign debt.
To illustrate this idea, consider a situation where all countries wish to issue debt with the same maturity T; but where they di¤er with respect to their weight in total debt, their total debt process and their default risk. The coordination of debt policies by a central agency allows us to formulate the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 If each of the N EMU member countries issues at the same time w i face value units of government debt with identical maturity T , with P i w i = 1; through a proportion D i of domestic debt and the rest of foreign debt, the debt allocation
Such an allocation could not be made by countries alone, because …xing the aggregate debt level gives them the incentive to borrow fully on either market, depending on the behavior of the default spread.
On the other hand, focusing on the determination of the optimal global borrowing is impossible without knowing the allocation of domestic debt among member countries, as the associated default risks appear in the total cost function. These two problems cannot be disentangled, nor can they be solved individually.
This result corresponds to the idea put forward by Nielsen (1999) more than a decade before the 2010 Greek crisis. He emphasizes the need for a mechanism that would coordinate debt management policies. Such a coordination accompanies the determination of the optimal aggregate debt. If the determination of all debt is not simultaneous, Proposition 7 collapses to Corollary 6.
V. Structural evolution of EMU debt mix
We examine whether our theoretical framework is consistent with some of the observed debt structure developments by analyzing the evolution of sovereign debt mix around the creation of EMU. The key drivers of the evolution of sovereign debt issued by EMU members are reviewed before and after the adoption of the single currency in 1999. The e¤ectiveness and the appropriateness of their debt management are analyzed in light our e¢ ciency indicators. We …rst review the evolution of the key structural and strategic variables. We then introduce the calibrated values of the parameters in our model and verify whether the actual debt mix and maturities are in line with the theoretical predictions driving to a minimization of the cost of debt.
Before the EMU, Austria and Finland exhibited a higher proportion of foreign debt than the other future EMU countries (Table 1) . This empirical …nding is especially strong for Finland, for which the proportion of foreign debt was even above 50% in 1994 and 1995. 7 The observed evolution of the Finnish case can be understood through our theoretical cost-minimization model. Table 2 reports the mean values of the di¤erent key variables of the model during the 1994-1998 period.
Insert Table 2 approximately here Our model predicts that Finnish debt should have a fully foreign structure before the EMU (D th = 0%).
The strategic exchange rate risk indicator, K 21 ; is positive and exhibits the highest coe¢ cient after Italy.
Therefore, the impact of debt management on the exchange rate in the foreign economy is quite strong.
The default, devaluation and liquidity risk indicator K 11 is globally large and positive, which also favors foreign debt. Note that these stylized facts mostly result from the relatively low intrinsic default risk and the very high net intrinsic devaluation and liquidity risks. The signs of i (positive) and i (negative) indicate further why foreign debt is preferred. The propensity to default on domestic debt (conditional on defaulting on foreign debt) is positive, while the indirect impact of a devaluation of the domestic currency on foreign debt is negative. Finally, the opportunity cost indicator K 22 is negative. The savings obtained by taking on domestic debt are small and presumably slightly higher than the opportunity cost if foreign debt is used instead, but this fact does not o¤set the importance of K 11 . In other words, X + Y > 0: This latter observation could explain why Finland has limited the proportion of foreign debt. These results show that the Finnish debt structure was not inconsistent with an e¢ cient cost minimization policy.
Parameters are also consistent with likely higher foreign debt ratios for Austria. Our estimation suggests that optimality requires a very high amount of proportion debt (K 11 is strongly positive and K 22 slightly negative). Some elements could have induced Austria to restrain this proportion. The intrinsic devaluation and liquidity risk are much lower than in Finland, since the Austrian schilling was somehow pegged to the German mark, which may justify less relative foreign debt. A negative i suggests signi…cant social and political costs of defaulting on domestic debt. Similarly, i is positive, translating a greater impact of a devaluation on foreign debt. These examples illustrate that each indicator of the model cannot be considered in isolation. Only the combined e¤ect determines the appropriateness of the debt structure.
Our theoretical model is also consistent with the pattern exhibited by Italy. A higher uncertainty and a strongly negative K 11 clearly limits the use of foreign debt. Positive values of i and i both suggest that the market expected a signi…cant impact of a devaluation of the lira on the Italian foreign debt. Our model predicts 100% domestic debt for Italy while the actual average ratio was 92.8%. One coe¢ cient in favor of lower domestic debt is the opportunity cost indicator, K 22 , that is slightly positive, but overall X + Y < 0.
The case of the Netherlands, whose proportion of foreign debt is nil (Table 1) , is also instructive. The Dutch solution is therefore an extreme one. This empirical …nding is hardly unexpected and can be explained by the theoretical model that also predicts D th = 100%. Another point is also the average term to maturity of the total (domestic) Dutch debt that is relatively higher than in other future EMU countries, and this does not favor mixed borrowing. The other future EMU members exhibit coe¢ cients favoring more domestic debt. For example, we obtain for France and Spain negative K 11 and K 22 , all of which clearly call for the observed domestic debt proportions of almost 100%.
The introduction of the euro and the EMU has led to dramatic changes for all countries. A general decline in the proportion of foreign debt is observed among all the EMU members. Remarkably, Finland's proportion of foreign debt plummets from 61.2% in 1994 to 0% in 2007. Similarly, Irish foreign debt drops from 39.4%
in 1995 to nil in 2003. In contrast, before the EMU, these two countries have good reasons to issue relatively higher proportions of foreign debt. However, after 1999, they are induced to reduce sharply this proportion.
According to our framework, heavy borrowers should borrow more on the foreign market. Together with Portugal, Finland and Ireland report the lowest borrowing weights in the total debt in the eurozone. The fact that they are light borrowers is probably not the only reason. At the same time, the other countries are also led to reduce the proportion of foreign debt, but more smoothly than Finland and Ireland. their sign, which may suggest that the sign of i has changed from negative to positive, which means that defaulting in the foreign market is now more likely to coincide with default on domestic debt.
Finland also has a K 11 that is strongly negative -even without the variance term. The sign of i has also changed, but in contrast to Austria, i becomes negative, suggesting that social and political cost on defaulting on domestic debt has increased, leading to the preference for domestic debt. The variance has fallen, which could be partly explained by the disappearance of devaluation risk. The situation of Italy did not change compared to the ex-ante EMU period. K 11 is still negative, i and K 22 are still positive.
Belgium and Ireland report full domestic debt in 2010. Their patterns are also consistent with those of Austria, Finland and Italy. K 11 is strongly negative for these countries as well, leading to a full domestic debt solution and i is positive. For Ireland, the variance is quite signi…cant and K 11 is positive before subtracting the variance term.
VI. Conclusion
Since the recent EMU sovereign debt crisis, market participants have been scrutinizing more than ever for (un)sustainable debt levels in assessing default risks. Beyond …scal policies and total debt to GDP levels, investors should not overlook the government debt currency structure and its corresponding maturity in their valuation. We show that these issues are intimately related, because debt choice is a matter of trade-o¤ between di¤erent sources of costs. Through a simple pricing model, this paper derives indicators to assess the e¢ ciency of the debt mix choice by a government. Indicators favoring mixed borrowing are shown to be mostly determined by a set of intrinsic characteristics for those whose cost of domestic debt is large. It thus calls for recourse to the foreign market, while strategic factors are more crucial for countries choosing to borrow on the domestic market. Departures from an optimal combination of domestic and foreign debt would increase both the total yield spread of the country and its vulnerability to sovereign debt crises.
The situation before the EMU is characterized by the very dissimilar nature of yields attached to the alternative markets. The change in borrowing conditions can be perceived by the considerable dilution of each country's e¤ect on exchange rate risks into the cost of debt function, and the consequences of the perceived lack of credibility of the no bail out clause are sensitive to short term debt. These consequences are asymmetric: their bene…ts depend on each country's propensity to default on domestic debt, while their costs are commonly shared. Furthermore, the modi…cations in credit quality seem to favor higher proportions of domestic debt at the optimum, especially for long term debt. Sovereign debt data seem roughly consistent with our theoretical model, but the analysis of the combined e¤ect of each intrinsic and strategic variable is important to determine whether the chosen debt mix is optimal.
Introducing the euro as a single currency and the conduct of an independent monetary policy at the level of the EMU should have opened up the way to a re ‡ection on the appropriateness of the debt mix at the European level. Our results indicate a steady decline in the proportion of foreign debt after the introduction of the euro, which is consistent with the strong negative structural in ‡ation in the EMU. This could be the result of the primary task of the ECB, which is the …ght against in ‡ation. One should now to consider whether an independent monetary policy is consistent with allowing governments to decide freely on their debt currency mix, which comes after the setting of the sovereign government expenditures and tax policies.
The decision of many European countries to primarily issue euro-denominated debt, although broadly consistent with our prediction, leads to corner solutions that might not be fully cost-e¤ective. Given the large overall outstanding debt of EMU countries underpinning the sovereign debt crisis, European governments should not overlook the importance of …nding sources of cost savings, and we believe that the currency decision should contribute to this re ‡ection. We emphasize that a central, coordinated approach to determine debt levels and maturities could result in a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. The idea of issuing "euro bonds", following the Greece debt crisis, is a step going in that direction, but it is motivated by urgency. Long-term economic gains shared across the EMU countries could be achieved by designing a structural mechanism that manages debt composition for the bene…t of all. This could further reassure investors about the e¢ ciency and the credibility of the sovereign debt structure in the EMU. 
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